Protecting self-rule by shared rule -Functions of bicameral systems
Federalism has been defined as a polity combining self-rule of central and regional governments and shared rule among these governments (Elazar 1987: 5) . This definition also applies to federalising states in which regions, or some regions, have achieved a significant extent of autonomy to govern their affairs. Self-rule rests on a separation of powers between levels of government defined by the constitution. Shared rule usually finds expression in intergovernmental relations, which exist in a variety of institutionalised or informal patterns.
Regarding these two dimensions of a vertical division of powers in federations of regionalised states, a bicameral system can fulfil two functions: First, second chambers representing regional interests should protect the autonomy of regional governments against encroachments by central legislation into their constitutionally guaranteed jurisdiction. Thus, they serve as a safeguard of self-rule (Bednar 2009). Second, bicameralism allows representatives from constituent units of a federation or from regions to participate in central legislation in order to ensure that particular interests of these units are considered. In this way, bicameral legislatives work as a core institution of shared rule.
Whereas self-rule can be effectively protected by a second chamber's veto against legislation, shared rule requires the willingness of both chambers to find an agreement.
Regardless of which function prevails, bicameralism essentially aims at limiting the power of the centre.
These two functions are only fulfilled in an effective way in federations where the legislative chambers actually represent both the demos and the demoï of constituent units or their governments and where they are linked by processes of joint decision-making.
Whether the first condition applies depends on the selection of representatives, their affiliation to parties, communities of citizens or governments, and the extent to which these affiliations influence debates and decision-making in a chamber. As a rule, I the first chamber consists of directly elected representatives of the demos, which includes citizens on an equal basis. In federations, members of second chambers are normally selected on a 
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The second condition depends on the decision rules in a bicameral legislature. Effective protection of self-rule and shared rule requires that both chambers participate in legislation on an equal footing so that they have to harmonise their decisions, which actually means that they make joint decisions. Joint decision-making, which in bicameral system is attributable to the veto power of a second chamber, strongly limits central power and constraints the power of a majority in parliament. As they share legislative powers, two chambers have to vote in favour of a bill in order to pass it as law, otherwise, legislation fails, and neither the federal nor the regional governments can make law, the former because of a legislative deadlock, the latter because it has no power to legislate. In order to come to concordant votes in both chambers, a bill has to be negotiated between leaders of majority parties or groups in both chambers, often including members or groups who are pivotal for achieving the required votes.
In legislatures with second chambers having no veto rights, these latter can nonetheless compel the first chamber to a joint decision because of an overlap of tasks fulfilled by central or regional governments. This interdependence of policies, despite a separation of powers and the self-rule of governments, regularly appears in the executive, in particular when governments provide public goods or services, which generate cross-border (external) effects. In legislative decisions, both levels of governments are actually affected in matters of institutional reform or if the allocation of powers is at stake. In these policies, most second chambers with consultative rights in normal legislation have veto rights as far as a constitutional amendment is necessary. Hence, bicameralism usually institutionalises 'intragovernmental' joint decision-making at the federal level, whereas intergovernmental relations in the executive mostly arise to manage interdependence in an institutional setting of self-rule with shared-rule resulting from informal coordination.
In brief, bicameralism protects self-rule through shared rule; thus, it conforms to a basic principle of a constitutional government. It prevents a concentration of power and protects interests of minorities against what Alexis de Tocqueville has called a 'tyranny of the majority' (Tocqueville 1835: 410). Power limitation is most effective if both chambers have to come to joint decisions. Under these conditions, a second chamber can effectively protect the autonomy of regional governments by using its veto power against legislation threatening regional self-rule. Preventing a bill from becoming law can also help minorities to defend their particular interests against general regulation. Failure to pass a law on a 
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matter, which is on the legislative agenda, may be also be an outcome preferred by opposition parties in parliament. However, non-decisions undermine the effectiveness of a government and can destabilise a political system. If limitation of governmental power goes too far, legitimacy can suffer. A way out of this dilemma is negotiated legislation, which is regularly preferred to a deadlock, even if a compromise often is considered as a suboptimal outcome. For this reason, a bicameral system needs to optimise the limitation of power, it also must work in a way that prevents shared rule from ending in the joint decision trap.
In order to shed light on this challenge and to make recommendations for coping with them in practical politics, we need to understand how joint decision-making in bicameral legislatures works, how policies are made in the chambers and how both come to a joint decision. The theory of joint decision-making (Scharpf 1976; Scharpf 1988) has often been reduced to an explanation of the trap. However, on closer inspection, we find that it points out different modes of negotiation and various conditions affecting which negotiation mode applies, and the particular consequences on policy-making. In the following sections, I will outline the basic analytical categories and causal mechanisms, which might be useful to explain the operation of bicameral systems in federal and regionalised states. Moreover, I will explain why bicameral systems operating according to the joint decision mode are difficult to change, and why they tend to be locked in the joint decision-trap of constitutional policy.
Institutions and decision rules: Bicameral legislation as joint decision-making
Bicameral legislatures vary in many respects, including not only scope of legislative and supervisory powers, but also their very institutional composition (Coakley 2014; Heller and Branduse 2014; Leunig 2009; Patterson and Mughan 2001; Palermo and Kössler 2017: 165-176; Russell, 2013, 46-63; Riescher et al. 2010; Uhr 2006) . In respect of the division of powers, not all bicameral legislatures establish joint-decision systems; some second chambers for instance only play a consultative role. In other cases, the vote of a second chamber can be overruled by the first chamber but nonetheless has a constraining effect, like in the British Parliament where the veto of the House of Lord can cause significant delay to the passage of legislation. We also find bicameral legislatures, with both chambers In western democracies, the power of second chambers tends to be constrained (first and foremost in fiscal policy) if they lack democratic legitimacy compared to the popularly elected chamber of parliament. In bicameral systems with a directly elected second chamber (e.g. the Senates in Australia, Brazil, Italy, Switzerland and the U.S.), both houses of the legislature usually have equal powers. To make law, both have to pass an identical bill. Accordingly, each chamber can veto a bill. In this case, decision rules require joint decision-making. In asymmetrical bicameral systems, powers of the second chamber vary depending on issues at stake. In Germany, for instance, the assent of the Bundesrat is only necessary whenever a law affects the jurisdiction of the Länder. Otherwise, the Federal Parliament has the final say in legislation (see Niedobitek 2018). In Austria, Belgium and Spain, only laws amending the constitution require the assent of the second chamber.
When both chambers are required to reach an agreement in legislation, procedures for conciliation vary among bicameral systems. Irrespective of other rules, these procedures usually provide for a particular sequence of deliberations and resolutions of the individual chambers. That sequence of the legislative process can be the same in all instances or may differ even within one bicameral system depending on specific conditions (e.g. by policy area, type of legislative act, etc.). In any case, the configuration of decision-making procedures has an impact on power relations in a bicameral system, although the consequences are ambiguous. On the one hand, the chamber where a bill is tabled, and where a first decision is made before the bill is forwarded to the other chamber, has a 'first mover advantage'. It can constrain the discretion of the chamber that is second in turn and can at best amend the version of a bill passed by the first chamber. On the other hand, the chamber with the final decision might be able to block legislation if the proposal passed in the other chamber is considered unacceptable. This other chamber has to take into account the risk that its decision might be void if it cannot respond anymore with a revision of a bill.
Power is one consequence of sequential procedures; the effectiveness of joint decisionmaking is another. Those actors who initiate a bill or who are the first to decide on it are motivated to anticipate potential vetoes in the other chamber in order to reduce the risk of i.e. to voluntarily refrain from asserting their preferences or to pre-emptively moderate them. This strategic behaviour is possible, provided that the interests and preferences of the members or coalitions forming a majority in a legislative chamber are known, or can be predicted with high probability. The type of members and the cleavage structures in a chamber constitute relevant factors that allow veto anticipation. Yet this is not always possible. Party affiliation provides a rather good indicator of voting behaviour of members, but it may only constitute one factor influencing their preferences. Moreover, since the number of parties represented in a chamber is currently increasing in many western democracies and, as in a second chamber a majority is usually not determined by coalition agreements but varies from issue to issue, the capacity to reliably anticipate vetoes is limited from the outset.
Another way to find a bicameral agreement, also requiring a sequential procedure, is mutual adjustment. If the two chambers have sufficient opportunities to respond to the decision taken by the other chamber, as provided for by the 'navette' procedures, they might be able to come to identical decisions through mutual adjustment. Yet this process can be time consuming, which is why the number of decisions taken in each chamber is usually limited. Another rule to avoid an endless iteration of debates and decisions applies in France, where the prime minister can request a final vote of the parliament (Money and Tsebelis 1997: 1994) .
Irrespective of these decision procedures, legislative chambers usually coordinate their votes in negotiations. As a rule, agreements are negotiated informally among leaders of the majority groups, the head of government or the responsible minister and members of a second chamber, with these negotiations often concentrating on actors holding a pivotal position to form a majority. If informal negotiations fail, they might continue in joint committees set up to find a compromise between divergent bills proposed by the chambers.
More often than not, the federal executive initiates and leads informal negotiations, since the executive drafts most bills in order to achieve the governmental program or agenda. These negotiations are most intensive if the second chamber assembles representatives from regional governments, like in the German Bundesrat. Here, legislation requiring the assent of the second chamber starts with pre-legislative intergovernmental These informal negotiations are often criticised as non-transparent; they prevent voters from ascribing responsibility for decisions and as they allow politicians to shift the blame or to claim success, they can undermine democratic accountability. However, as long as the final decisions are made in public, informality should not be overrated since it constitutes a decisive condition of effective negotiation democracy. Agreements can hardly be achieved in public debates, not least since parties compete for electoral support. They require that actors build trust and negotiate without 'tied hands', i. E -38 of a bill, which subsequently can only be accepted or rejected, but not amended in the legislative chambers. Although existing as formal institutions, they also work in private in order to shield the members from external pressure.
Informal negotiations and negotiations in formal joint committees reduce the probability that joint decision-making ends in a deadlock. Veto anticipation and mutual adjustment also contribute to avoiding this negative outcome of legislation, although they imply higher risks of failure. In asymmetrical bicameral systems, these processes occur in the shadow of a majority decision, usually by the directly elected parliament or, as the case may be, the popular chamber. This shadow might also result from the possibility of a call for a referendum. In France, for instance, the President can submit a bill to a popular vote, whereas in Switzerland, it is left to the people to initiate a facultative referendum. While decisions of parliamentary majorities are usually known, the outcome of a referendum is uncertain. For this reason, the latter generates more incentive for members of the legislature to come to a broad-based agreement, while in cases where the first chamber has the final say, this incentive is moderate and depends on the power of the majority in 
Confrontation, bargaining or arguing: Conditions of negotiating agreements between chambers
Negotiations aim to find a common ground among actors who pursue divergent interests, but are willing or compelled to harmonise their decisions through dialogue. In general, actors taking part in negotiations wish to come to an agreement, if they voluntarily engage in these. In joint-decision systems, they are compelled to do so. Nonetheless, they are not forced to negotiate, but urged to find an agreement, since they are otherwise unable to act at all. This also applies to joint decision-making in bicameral systems, although the actors involved in legislation advocate different policies, whether for policy or vote seeking reasons. Nonetheless, members of governments and parliaments who are accountable to citizens presumably try to avoid deadlocks in legislation, and members of second chambers usually prefer a compromise to rejecting a bill passed by the directly elected parliament (or its popular chamber), even if they have the right to exercise veto power. Therefore, actors' behaviour in bicameral legislatures is guided by mixed motives. As responsible representatives of citizens, most of them prefer an agreement between both chambers over voting down a bill. Nevertheless, all of them are associated to parties or groups, which pursue different policies and want to see most of their own ideas of good regulation becoming law.
The fact that negotiations constitute a mixed-motive game among the actors involved makes agreements possible. Still, there is a chance of deadlock, depending on the intensity of conflict, the behaviour of negotiating actors, the autonomy of negotiators from external influence, their dependence on external support, or the consequences of a non-decision.
But irrespective of how these conditions materialise, negotiators will aim at compromises or package deals. While strategies of brinkmanship are not uncommon, in most cases, these outcomes appear better than a deadlock, not the least from the point of view of parties This effect does not necessarily result from institutions constraining legislation, more often than not it appears for the very reason that actors want to escape impending deadlock. This is the conclusion which Fritz W. Scharpf drew from his original studies on joint decision-making in Germany and the EU (Scharpf 1988). Since then, theory has become differentiated, inspired by comparative research (Scharpf 1997 , Falkner 2011 Benz 2016b) . One important conclusion is that the probability of a deadlock and of ineffective decisions depends on specific conditions shaping the process of negotiations, i.e. conditions which affect how actors behave and which mode of interaction prevails in negotiations. In bicameral legislatures, two types of conditions seem to be particularly significant: One is the impact of party politics in the second chamber, the other relates to the cleavage structures which determine politics and voting in a bicameral legislature. Certainly, particular events or crises can modify the negotiation behaviour of relevant actors, but the impact of party politics and cleavage structures remains.
To explain the effect of these conditions, we can construct categories of typical modes of negotiation as confrontation, bargaining and arguing (Benz 2016a: 33). Confrontation occurs, if actors stick to their positions. In consequence, the probability of an agreement decreases to the extent that these positions diverge. Bargaining evolves, if actors pursue their interests but are willing to make concessions in order to achieve a compromise or settle conflicts by a package deal. Arguing requires actors to give reasons for their policy and to search for the solution of a problem or a conflict. If a solution can be justified on generalisable grounds, it is likely to find approval among all involved participants and the negotiations will end with a consensus.
In politics, arguing seems to be an ideal, whereas in reality bargaining and confrontation seem to prevail. By and large, this is correct, although it is worth noting that arguing should not be ruled out (Bächtiger et al. 2018; Elster 1998) 
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Moreover, particular institutional conditions foster arguing behaviour. As mentioned above second chambers, mainly consulting on bills, and including senior, experienced politicians, tend to negotiate in this mode. Arguing behaviour is also likely to emerge in committees where specialists, who are motivated to solve problems, meet. The same applies to private meetings in which negotiators can discuss free from external pressure and control.
Mediating committees constitute venues where representatives tend to negotiate in the arguing mode, and this explains why they often help to find a compromise between politically divided legislative chambers, as mentioned above. These different cleavages can reinforce each other, for instance, if the party system reflects the divide of a multinational federation or if economic disparities or fiscal policy conflicts ignite regional nationalism. If they persist for some time, such congruent cleavages find expression in a disintegration of the party system, as can be observed in Canada and in Belgium. Congruent cleavages tend to ignite confrontation, but not necessarily between legislative chambers. In Belgium, territorial conflicts shape politics in the federal parliament, while in Canada they are expressed and managed in intergovernmental relations. The Spanish legislature on the other hand seems to represent a bicameral system burdened by mutually reinforcing territorial and party-political cleavages.
However, different patterns of conflict can also combine to crosscutting cleavages.
They exist in particular in federations with integrated party systems such as Austria and Germany, where representatives of different territories may be aligned to the same party and where members from opposing parties may pursue the same territorial interests. The overlap of converging and diverging interests following from crosscutting cleavages prevents actors from maintaining their positions in negotiations and motivates them to find agreements. Under these conditions, bargaining behaviour is most likely to prevail in processes aiming at a coordination of decisions in bicameral legislatures, but arguing behaviour can also occur. Bargaining makes a deadlock unlikely, but it often ends with ineffective compromises or inefficient package deals. Crosscutting cleavages caused by two-or multidimensional patterns of conflict make package deals more complicated since the number of issues to be considered increases. Therefore, negotiations mostly result in compromises unless institutional conditions favour arguing processes.
To conclude: Bicameral systems established to constrain the power of central government and to protect self-rule of constituent units in principle fulfil their functions if they require joint decision-making in federal legislation. Given favourable conditions, joint decisions can be achieved in formal or informal negotiations: if the shadow of a majority decision drives the key actors in the chambers to find an agreement; if committees for mediating conflicts between chambers exist; or if conflicts predominating politics in each chamber combine to crosscutting cleavages. If party politics reinforces cleavages dividing a bicameral legislature, the need to come to joint decisions complicates legislation, reduces effectiveness of governance and can undermine the legitimacy of a polity. Under these adverse conditions, balancing self-rule and shared rule will most likely fail. They increase the probability of a deadlock in federal legislation; this does not imply that power migrates to lower level governments but that the governance of the federation is at risk. In this case, the joint decision trap in policy-making calls for a reform of the bicameral system. Yet, considering this special institution, a policy of constitutional reform faces even higher barriers (Russell and Sandford 2002) .
The joint decision trap: Can bicameral systems be reformed?
Ineffective governance, legitimacy deficit and an imbalance of power in a federation give reasons for institutional reform. Changes in the composition of second chambers or of decision rules in bicameral systems require amendments of the constitution. As a rule, laws amending the constitution have to be passed in both chambers (Kemmerzell and Petersohn 2012) . In other words, reforms determined to change the institutional conditions of joint decision-making or to eliminate the need for joint decisions in legislation are by themselves matters of joint decision-making. In consequence, members of second chambers can veto a reform which reduces their power or affects their other interests. For this reason, significant changes of structures or decision rules of a bicameral system are unlikely, although they are not impossible. Anyway, bicameralism can lead a government to be caught in the joint decision-trap, i.e. significantly constrained by veto players and at the same time unable to alter institutions causing these constraints (Scharpf 1988: 267-271 ).
There are certainly cases of reform in federations or regionalised states which passed bicameral legislation (Benz 2016a). In some states, constitutional amendments abolished second chambers altogether, in New Zealand in 1950, in Denmark in 1956, and in Sweden in 1971. In the UK, the Labour government, when returned to power in 1997, made first strides to renovate the House of Lords, although the envisaged reform remained an unfinished project. A recent reform of the Italian Senate was rejected in a referendum, after it had been approved in both chambers of parliament. In Ireland, both houses of the parliament had decided to abolish the second chamber, but as in Italy, the constitutional amendment failed in the referendum. And more examples of significant changes in bicameralism could be added. However, there are also cases demonstrating the difficulties of such a reform. In Canada, various attempts to turn the unpopular Senate into an elected chamber or to limit the Senators' term of office have failed. In Germany, a constitutional amendment reduced the Bundesrat's veto powers in quantitative terms, but in legislation affecting the jurisdiction of the Länder, they still exist; however, farther reaching reform proposals never made it on to the agenda of federalism reform. In Romania, a consultative referendum recommended abolishing the second chamber, but the political elite was not willing to implement the reform. 
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These examples suggest the hypothesis that significant reforms of bicameral systems, including their replacement by a unicameral legislature, are more likely in unitary states, in particular if second chambers appear as historical relics. In contrast, second chambers appear to be enduring institutions in federal systems. Here, they are justified on normative grounds; apart from protecting the self-rule of lower level governments, they should represent territorial interests in shared rule at the federal level. It is evident that, in reality, they do not always appropriately fulfil these functions (Russell 2001, 113-114) , and this article provides theoretical reasons why this might be the case. Nonetheless, proponents of bicameralism have stronger arguments to defend them than those who make the case for unicameralism. This does not rule out initiatives to amend a federal bicameral system. Yet, whenever change occurs, it turns out to be moderate and hardly deviating from a pathdependent institutional evolution.
Path-dependency points to an explanation provided by historical institutionalism. This theory does not rule out the occurrence of change, but it is said to take place under exceptional conditions opening a critical juncture. Yet, considering bicameralism, Kathleen Thelen and Sebastian Karcher (2013) have revealed, in an instructive case study on the evolution of the German Bundesrat, that critical junctures have led to continuity while the institution changed during periods of historical evolution. The findings of their case study are in line with the theory of joint decision-making outlined in this article. Actors in federal bicameral systems can incrementally adjust their practice and may also agree on moderate changes of decision rules, but they would hardly approve a far-reaching change of structures. However, for the same reasons that explain why joint decision-making in secondary legislation constrains governance but does not prevent decisions, institutions can evolve in an incremental way, although they are caught in the joint decision trap of constitutional policy. And, in the same way that the outcome of secondary legislation in bicameral systems varies according to conditions, the success or failure of constitutional reforms depends on specific conditions, some of which are given whereas others can be shaped by governments or parliaments (Benz 2016a).
Conclusions
Bicameral systems, even those in federations, vary. In general, they establish institutions operating according to the logic of joint decision-making. Under unfavourable conditions, legislation can fail, ending either in a deadlock or with ineffective compromises or inefficient package deals. However, powers of both chambers may be equal or different (symmetric or asymmetric bicameralism) and the selection of members of second chambers may lead to congruent or incongruent majorities in both chambers. Therefore, the variety of bicameral systems should make scholars cautious about generalising conclusions regarding their operation or their effects on policy-making. Not all of them require joint decision-making in all legislative matters, and even in symmetric bicameral legislatures where joint decisions are the rule, their impact on legislation and on the federal balance of power depends on particular conditions. Joint decision-making is a relevant concept to understand legislation in federal systems. Here, this pattern of negotiated legislation appears as an effective safeguard to protect self-rule and to include regional government in shared rule. However, bicameral systems may cause a federation or a legislature to fall in the joint decision-trap, and they regularly prevent constitutional amendments that seek to significantly change power relations between chambers.
This conclusion eschews providing reasons for speaking for or against bicameralism. It implies that the varieties of institutions, actor constellations, processes and conditions need to be taken into account. In general, bicameralism constitutes a dilemma between constraining power and enabling policy-making by applying power. Yet in democratic government under the rule of law, politics is always about coping with such dilemmas.
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